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Following a conceptual analysis of the term “quasi-market”,
this article will look at four national efforts to reform health-
care management in what can be regarded, in respect of the
degree of solidarity and universality applied, as three
different health-care models. The changes in Chile are a
continuation of the country’s previous reform, which went
further than any other in the region in undermining the
solidarity and universality of the health-care model. The
conclusion is that it would be beneficial to consolidate purely
managerial aspects so that progress can be made with the
use of administered prices, relevant information on the
quality and cost of care can be produced, and efficiency and
effectiveness criteria can be applied to clinical services. In
Argentina and Colombia, while there are large differences
between the two, the changes that have been made are part
of a reform process aimed at encouraging competition while
upholding the principles of solidarity and universality.
Because change has mainly centred on the financing model,
management has had a subordinate place since the outset.
In the case of Colombia, the article highlights the excessive
complexities of hospital financing, which have combined
with regulatory shortcomings to inhibit management change.
In the case of Argentina, where hospitals are excessively
large, it describes the wide range of hospital management
reforms that have resulted from past decentralization, the
degree to which management is independent of fiscal
discipline and the different ideas that exist of the part played
by hospitals in referral systems. In the case of Costa Rica,
where health care is primarily public and based on principles
of solidarity and universality, the article looks at the creation
of internal health markets that resulted from the introduction
of a new performance-related organizational and financing
model in the Costa Rican Social Security Fund; it notes that
the management contracts used have interesting features as
regards organization and information and the shaping of a
health-care system, but that they are excessively complex
and involve high transaction costs, and it analyses the
difficulties involved in introducing real provider
decentralization and creating performance incentives.
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I
Introduction
Health quasi-markets promote competition among
providers and/or insurers, but differ from conventional
markets in certain respects. On the demand side, buying
power is manifested in the form of a budget agreed
with the public-sector purchasing organization.
Consumers are represented by agents, i.e., by a buying
organization whose character is determined by the way
the quasi-market is organized and by the ground rules
of the insurance system. Prices are negotiated or
administered within a budgetary framework. Supply,
meanwhile, can embrace various forms of ownership
–State, municipal, trusts, consortia and non-profit-
making organizations– which may be subject to
different financing rules (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993,
pp. 23 and 24).
Competition can be introduced at different levels,
by altering the public-private mix through the extension
of private-sector involvement, or by changing the
charters of public-sector provider institutions to give
them greater independence in the way they use their
resources in a competitive environment governed by
the regulatory framework of a contract, or allowing
them to operate under private law. Different
mechanisms can promote competition among
providers, such as freedom of choice in the referral
system or among health-care professionals, or
competition for budgets among hospitals.
Quasi-markets conform to two rationales.1 Where
public-sector providers are concerned, the aim is to
introduce competition in the public sphere by
separating functions, thereby improving efficiency and
quality. Where a public-private mix is concerned
(when health is regarded as a public good because its
positive externalities are greater than the individual
benefits, or as a merit good that actualizes a social
right), the aim is to cater to demand, irrespective of
providers’ prices and individuals’ state of health and
ability to pay, by applying ground rules for insurance,
financing and provision that establish conditions of
solidarity by means of cross-subsidies among income
strata or risk or age groups, or by means of subsidies
to specific groups. In both cases, financing is linked
to productivity, coverage, yield and success in meeting
targets.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, management
reforms now being implemented represent moves
towards the creation of quasi-markets. These reforms
have been applied to health-care models that are
dissimilar in terms of their guiding principles, the
responsibilities of the public and private sectors, service
and population coverage, financing and insurance
models, and regulation. In many cases, the legal basis
for the mechanisms introduced is flimsy, pricing plays
a strictly theoretical role, and consolidation would
require changes in employment practices that would
be politically very complex to achieve. Despite
everything, the quasi-markets that are in prospect offer
a promising route towards the goals of greater
efficiency, accountability, responsiveness and choice,
without adverse consequences for equity. This article
analyses the management reforms implemented in
Chile, Colombia, Argentina and Costa Rica, considering
the progress they have brought about and the obstacles
that have arisen in practice.
The author wishes to thank Jairo Restrepo and the research team
at the Economic Research Centre (CIE) of the University of
Antioquia for their views on a previous version of this article and
their comments on the concept of health and the Colombian reforms,
and Oscar Altimir for his remarks on this version.
1
 In conversation, Rebeca Grynspan distinguished two particular
rationales that have usually been implicitly assumed in discussions
of the subject.
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II
Chile: adjusting management when solidarity
and universality have been undermined
The Chilean reform of the 1980s, which was made
possible by an authoritarian context, was
unprecedentedly radical. It stands in complete contrast
to the British experience under the Conservative
Governments of Thatcher and Major. In Britain, the
Conservatives mounted a radical challenge to the
financing methods, scope of provision and public-
private mix of the National Health Service (NHS).
Following a variety of political developments that
impeded radical change, the NHS was reformed,
paradoxically, by increasing the separation of functions
with a view to promoting competition.2
Compulsory insurance is a feature of public or
national social insurance systems that seek to achieve
stable risk differentiation and may aim at redistribution
and social solidarity, with a variety of public-private
mixes. The Chilean health-care system, therefore, is
unique in the world. Under its dual logic, workers have
to pay compulsory subscriptions, entirely at their own
cost, which entitle them to membership of the public
health service through the National Health Fund
(Fonasa), whose distribution rationale favours
solidarity, or the private health insurance institutions
(Isapres), which operate on an individual risk-associated
private insurance basis.
Fonasa gives access to public provision under the
so-called institutional system or to private provision of
choice, subject to co-payments of various kinds, and is
also funded by other contributions deriving from the
public budget. Isapres, contrary to the logic natural to
a compulsory insurance scheme, provide individual
insurance plans that are renewable each year and
incorporate risk selection, as price and coverage are
adjusted for the age, health risk and sex of the insured.
They cover about 30% of the population, and their
prices have risen by far more than those of other sectors
of the economy.3 The public-sector scheme, which has
no barriers to entry, covers the lower-income and
higher-risk populations, and provides blanket
reinsurance for the system.
The measures taken so far to improve management
in the Chilean public health-care sector have been in
the nature of an adjustment, seeking to raise the
efficiency and effectiveness of the public subsystem
without altering the dual design of the public-private
mix introduced in the 1980s.
1. Organizational aspects and contractual
characteristics4
Management contracts between the central level and
health services were introduced in 1995, with resources
to be allocated and transferred to provider organizations
under an annual service provision agreement
establishing performance indicators. These
organizations were encouraged in turn to enter into
contracts with the public hospitals and municipalities
to which they were linked.5
These agreements have gradually helped to
organize relations between the health services and the
centre, which were traditionally governed by formal
and informal bilateral agreements between specific
organizations, resulting in a lack of coordination,
duplication and overlap, and in substantial resources
being devoted to lobbying. With the Ministry of Health
retaining provision functions, something that has been
identified as a major obstacle to restructuring the health
sector,6 agreements were also structured and evaluated
2
 Out-patient care by general practitioners was already provided
under contract; then hospitals were allowed to operate
independently under NHS contracts, which led to providers being
grouped into trusts. On the reforms to the British system, see Ferlie
and others (1996), Walsh (1995), Bach (1999) and Winchester and
Bach (1999). For a detailed discussion of the political process, see
also Porter (1999, pp. 236-259).
3
 Some figures will illustrate this: whereas in 1990 the average
additional contribution of Isapre subscribers was 0.7% of the
system’s average remuneration, by 1996 it had increased to 1.3%.
Between the two years the cost of private medical consultations
rose by 55% in real terms (Baeza and others, 1998, pp. 18 and 19).
4
 For details of Chilean management contracts and their context,
see Sojo (1996, 1998 and 1999a).
5
 There are management contracts among other agencies in the
health-care sector, but contracts with the health services account
for the bulk of health spending, so we shall henceforth refer
exclusively to these.
6
 Interview with César Oyarzo, former Director of Fonasa, on 22
August 1997.
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in a fragmented way to start with, but progress has been
made in rectifying this.7
The purchasing function, however, is still a
“theoretical” one within the health system. With the
exception of some special cases that have only a limited
impact on the overall budget, such as complex provision
or early treatment programmes, prices are essentially
for reference purposes (Lenz, 1998, pp. 193 and 194)
and are not laid down by the terms of contracts.
Although contract indicators cover the three levels
of health care, they emphasize primary and preventive
care. Goals are expressed mainly as indices of activity
and coverage. Health indicators, which were very weak
at first, have been improved, as has linkage with
ministerial and government targets. A rapid rise in the
number of indicators has led to an increasingly
ritualistic approach being taken to their use, making
proper assessment more difficult and creating high
transaction costs.
Efforts have been made to optimize the provision
network, with the aid of management contracts. Fonasa
has become an intermediary among services, and has
been restructured into five zones covering a number of
services, to achieve network continuity in the regions.
Regional committees have been set up to monitor
compliance with agreements,8 and contracts include
activities to strengthen the Programa de Oportunidad
de la Atención (Early Treatment Programme), in
primary care, and to create a more cohesive system of
rural primary care.
Paradoxically, however, implementation –which is
the heart of management– has been left entirely to the
discretion of the health services, and has not been fully
integrated into the agreements.9 Organizational
objectives or details of which intermediate products
have to be purchased have been specified only to a
marginal extent, and the same is true of the introduction
or improvement of information systems, the
optimization of poorly functioning processes, or the
development of new processes to make service
provision more effective and systematic. There has been
no major improvement in record-keeping as an
instrument for strengthening management capabilities.
To increase the productivity of human resources,
the recruitment and pay procedures currently followed
will need to be modified. A variety of rigidities in the
way human resources are handled are making
innovative management difficult. The sectors affected
have fought hard to block amendment of law no. 15.076,
which governs recruitment and remuneration
procedures for professionals in the health services. As
a result, no action has yet been taken on a 1995 bill
seeking to bring significantly more flexibility and
decentralization to employment practices, secure
recognition for performance, merit and effectiveness
as well as length of service, encourage the allocation
of individual responsibilities and link recognition of
individual performance to that of institutional
performance, and make competitive testing a
requirement for remaining in the system (Sojo, 1996).
2. Integrating management into reform
Management contracts could play a role in dealing with
issues that act as fundamental obstacles to reform.
Where charging and cost policies are concerned, for
example, the basic information of hospitals is
inadequate; in the complex pathologies programme,
there is no explicit national referral network. If
management contracts included process innovation,
useful information could be built up on the quality and
costs of care, or criteria of efficiency and effectiveness
could be introduced into clinical decision-making.
Thus, the failure to integrate management issues
properly into contracts limits the impact of these, by
preventing beneficial and efficient interaction with
sectoral reform.
For example, diagnosis-related pay has not replaced
historical budgeting, but has been used experimentally
in parallel with this in specific programmes, such as the
complex provision and early treatment programmes.
When it was first introduced at the hospital level,
participation was high and it was not perceived as a threat,
but it collapsed because information deficiencies and the
diversity of initial conditions made mass take-up
unviable.10 Consolidating management, through
contracts with health services or otherwise, would allow
progress to be made with diagnosis-related pay, which
could be based on agreed use of clinical protocols, for
example. Such a shift would require caution and a sense
of priorities.
7
 Interview of 3 September 1997 with Pedro Croco, then Director
of the Management Unit in the Ministry of Health.
8
 Interview with Rony Lenz, then Director of Fonasa, on 26 May
1998.
9
 This aspect of the agreements was pointed out by Rony Lenz in
the same interview. His references to the weakness of management
contracts were made in response to our critical approach to the
point in the interview, with which he agreed.
10
 This experience with diagnosis-related pay was described by
Rony Lenz in the interview referred to.
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There is also a need to simplify indicators
relating to the fulfilment of tasks specified in goals
and coverage targets, and to reduce their number
greatly.  If  i t  were decided to include some
intermediate products, processes and information
systems, this would have to be done very selectively
and for periods of t ime long enough for
implementation to be consolidated. Management
contracts must not be confused with planning by
objectives.
III
Colombia: management reform in a universal
cross-subsidized system, with competition
The redistributive impact of the Colombian reform has
been substantial. In 1993, effective health cover was
13.6 times as great in the top quintile of the population
as in the poorest quintile, but by 1997 this gap had
narrowed to 1.86 times (Colombia, National Council
of Social Security in Health, 2000, p. 13). Reform has
aimed both at universal coverage in service provision
and at competition among insurers and providers11 in a
decentralized, cross-subsidized system whose benefits
and obligations are consolidated into two regimes: the
contributory one, which is funded by worker-employer
contributions, and the subsidized one, which focuses
on the poorest. The first is regulated by the compulsory
medical plan (plan obligatorio de salud, or POS) and
the second by the subsidized compulsory medical plan
(plan obligatorio de salud subsidiado, or POSS). The two
are supposed to gradually converge.
The Solidarity and Guarantee Fund seeks to ensure
equality and a balance of resources in the contributory
system by means of a per capita payment that is adjusted
to prevent risk selection in service provision. It has four
sub-accounts: compensation, solidarity, promotion, and
catastrophic events and traffic accidents. It transfers 1%
of this system’s subscriptions to the subsidized scheme,
thereby topping up the funding this receives out of
general taxation. The aim is to move towards a system
in which services are financed by demand subsidy
–i.e., financing is determined by actual demand from
those insured– instead of by supply subsidy, which is
the term given to the method traditionally used to
finance providers that are overwhelmingly in the public
sector, based on historical budgets. Distributive
disparities and the position of suppliers as single
providers in particular geographical areas have made
it impossible to replace the one completely with the
other, and no conclusion has yet been reached about
the proportion that is desirable.
Both in theory and in practice, however, the
Colombian reform shows serious deficiencies as regards
the integration and complementarity of the service
network and the different levels of care. There is an
urgent need to take steps to increase microeconomic
efficiency. Management has played a secondary role,
and its shortcomings should be tackled as they hinder
progress overall (for example, by blocking resources
that are indispensable if coverage is to be widened).
This is happening just as the contents and rising cost of
insurance cover in the contributory system are being
reviewed for balance and financial sustainability, while
efforts to increase coverage in the subsidized system
are being compromised by the decline in funding from
the national budget, evasion in the contributory system
that affects cross-subsidy resources, and the cost of
moving from supply subsidies to demand subsidies
(Colombia, National Council of Social Security in
Health, 2000, pp. 13 and 20).
1. Complexities and complications of hospital
financing: the repercussions for performance
In 1993, the intricate architecture of the reform included
the transformation of public hospitals into State social
enterprises (empresas sociales del Estado, or ESEs),
which are decentralized public-sector bodies with a
legal personality, ownership of assets and administrative
11
 Insurance for the two systems is provided, respectively, by health
promotion organizations (entidades promotoras de salud, or EPS)
and subsidized system insurers (aseguradoras del régimen
subsidiado, or ARS), while health-care provision institutions
(instituciones prestadoras de salud, or IPS) operate the actual health
services. In all cases, they may be either public or private.
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autonomy (table 1). Decentralization linked public
hospitals with the departmental and municipal
authorities in their area (table 2), as a result of which
the influence of the national authority was weakened
and unprecedented tensions arose among these three
levels. It has been said that territorial autonomy in the
sector is subject to frequent incursions in the form of
national rules that detail how territorial health resources
can be used (Vargas and Sarmiento, 1998).
Pressure from hospitals for the retention of
historical financing, combined with the serious deficits
run by some of them, resulted in the plan to replace
supply subsidies with demand subsidies being frozen
for three years. In the absence of a solid basis of
information, the transition regime tolerates double
payments to hospitals in the form of supply and demand
subsidies, duplications in the insurance for the two
systems and the frequent invoicing of policyholders for
treatment in order to generate resources from provision
(Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999). Duplication of
payments also takes place at other levels of care, and
no adequate records are kept of the insurance and
services supplied using specific funds for people
displaced by violence.12 There is an urgent need to
identify, record, cross-reference and unify data on the
beneficiaries of the two regimes or of ad hoc funds, on
a national basis. This registration process is crucial to
avoid leaks and duplication and to administer the
insurance and provision systems, but progress has been
fitful (Colombia, National Council of Social Security
in Health, 2000, pp. 34 and 35).
The budgets for the three levels of public hospitals
have risen greatly: between 1993 and 1997, the level I
budget increased by a factor of 2.6, that of level II by a
factor of 1.9 and that of level III by a factor of 1.5.
Their medical staffs have doubled in the last 10 years,
and the wage scales of civil servants in the sector have
tripled, yielding a real increase that is higher than the
average for public-sector employees. Hospital financing
is highly complex, as its different sources each have
their own access mechanism, logic, allocation criteria,
budgeting systems and resource flows. To compound
the complexity, transfers also vary. For example, general
public funds earmarked for a hospital or health centre
may initially be transferred directly to the municipality,
the sectional health fund or the local health fund
(Jaramillo, 2000, pp. 45-46 and 108).
Resources allocated in accordance with historical
budgets come from the national and territorial levels,
with funding from the general public budget still the
main source of hospital financing. Hospitals and the
public social security network are supposed to use these
resources to treat people who have no insurance and
are unable to pay. So-called “auxilios”, contracts with
the State to treat poor people, which concealed
unconditional transfers, have been abolished.
Large amounts of funding are transferred
automatically, or at least are not linked to productivity.
Both the complexity and the diversity of public hospital
financing make it difficult for the expansion of funding
to be linked to the attainment of specified efficiency
and performance levels, which weakens these incentives
enormously. When the excessive complexity of
financing is considered, it needs to be remembered that
hospital provision is largely indivisible in respect of
the different sources of financing and the incentives
underlying them, which makes institutional and
organizational change difficult.
Nonetheless, some financing mechanisms do
provide for performance incentives. These include the
contracts to treat the uninsured population entered into
between territorial health funds and public and private
hospitals, which make financing conditional on real
increases in productivity and efficiency, and which have
mainly been applied in Antioquia and Bogotá, with a
wide variety of financial and managerial outcomes.13
Hospitals need to sell their services to insurance
policyholders, so their ability to generate resources of
TABLE 1
Colombia: Hospitals operating as State social enterprises
(ESEs) as of June 1998
Hospitals Total ESEs Percentage
Level III 28 23 82
Level II 125 120 96
Level I 354 194 55
Total 507 337 66
Source: Colombian Ministry of Health, Programa de Mejoramiento
de los Servicios de Salud, included in Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe
(1999).
12
 This subject was raised by Juan Fernando Alviar in a conversation
of 22 May 2001.
13
 These range from successes at the El Tunal Hospital in Bogotá
and the San Vicente de Paul Hospital in Medellín to the bankruptcy
of institutions such as the Lorencita Villegas Hospital and profound
restructuring of the type seen in the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Bogotá (Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999, pp. 19 and 62).
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their own and achieve real financial autonomy is partly
dependent on a crucial variable that is beyond their
control: the spread of insurance in the population. Thus,
in 1996, services sold accounted for a fifth of hospital
revenue, and of this fifth almost half went to the
subsidized system. Estimates of the extent to which the
coverage of the two systems has increased are
controversial.14
Meanwhile, territorial organizations and insurers
have run up payment arrears with providers, thus
causing deficits and cash-flow problems among a large
number of level II and III organizations. The rising debt
owed by subsidized system insurers to hospitals is
unaccountable, as these insurers’ subsidized system
operations have been in surplus: in 1996, 60% of their
funds were not spent (Jaramillo, 2000, p. 104).
The transition towards municipal decentralization
is also making it harder for hospitals to obtain resources,
and thus to develop as ESEs; the organizational failings
of municipalities militate against hospital
decentralization, since in uncertified municipalities15
the financing chain through which funds from the
general public budget pass is a tortuous one.16 There is
also a fear that the obstacles to resource allocation may
“reward local fiscal slackness”, if national fiscal
resources transferred through the municipality do not
ultimately reach the health-care sector (Jaramillo, 2000)
or, conversely, if there are delays in the flow of
resources that force the territorial level into debt. Huge
pension liabilities,17 which have not yet been properly
dealt with, are also swelling local authority debt
(Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999, pp. 23, 38 and
59).
With all these variables at work, the financial
statements of public hospitals in 1998 and 1999 showed
the whole array of situations from deficit to balance or
surplus. Deficits have even been covered using
resources from the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund that
are meant for other purposes.18
TABLE 2
Colombia, official health sector: Distribution of powers and
responsibilities after decentralizationa
Function Central or national level Departmental level Municipal level Hospital
Financing ++ ++ ++ +
Direction, oversight and control +++ + + ---
Appointment of directors --- ++ ++ ---
(Levels II and III) (Level I)
Planning and investment --- ++ ++ ++
Setting of pay rates +++ --- --- ---
Recruitment and dismissal --- ++(*) +(*) +(*)
(Sectional services)
Procurement + ++ ++ +++
Source: Produced by Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe (1999).
a The symbols mean the following:
(*) Subject to labour laws and governed by collective agreements.
+++ Full powers and responsibility.
++ Shared powers and responsibility.
+ Minimal powers and responsibility.
--- Absence of powers and responsibility.
14
 Eliminating duplications of data that exaggerate coverage can
lead to erroneous estimates of falling or static coverage (Colombia,
National Council of Social Security in Health, 2000, pp. 13-17
and 37, and Economic Research Centre, 2000, p. 7). Those who
believe coverage has remained static since 1998 attribute this to
the implementation of macroeconomic adjustments that had become
overdue, higher unemployment, doubts about the subsidized system
and vacillation at the national and departmental levels (Jaramillo,
2000, pp. 101 and 88).
15
 A form of transition has been established for the decentralization
of resources to the municipalities. Although the distinction has been
largely discretionary, municipalities that do not meet the technical,
financial and institutional development prerequisites for receiving
automatic transfers receive them with conditions attached through
their respective departments.
16
 In this case, a public hospital cannot pay a provider for services
or a supplier for inputs without the prior involvement of the Ministry
of Finance and Public Credit, the Ministry of Health, the department
and its departmental assembly, the municipality and its municipal
council, and the relevant subsidized system insurer (Londoño,
Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999, pp. 11 and 50).
17
 The pension liabilities that local authorities have built up with
their employees.
18
 Such as the catastrophic disease and traffic accident sub-accounts,
and the solidarity sub-account.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 1140
REFORMING HEALTH-CARE MANAGEMENT IN  LATIN AMERICA  •  ANA SOJO
2. The regulatory deficit as an obstacle to
performance and general effectiveness
The idea of regulation should be to lay the basis for
and oversee the efficient, competitive operation of the
market, in accordance with the principles of the health-
care model: universality, integrality, decentralization,
coordination, compulsory enrolment, solidarity,
freedom of choice, gradualism, efficiency and quality.
But there are serious regulatory shortcomings.
For one thing, the absence of clear rules has
resulted in a proliferation of insurance organizations
whose characteristics and diseconomies of scale mean
that they do not necessarily meet the conditions for
efficiency. The existence of 200 subsidized system
insurers is evidence enough in itself of high transaction
costs. Of these, just 4% have more than 25,000
subscribers, 84% have between 5,000 and 25,000, and
8% have less than 5,000 (Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe,
1999, p. 48). This is reminiscent of the hypertrophy,
inefficiency and rising costs of health intermediaries
in Argentina, associated among other things with high
administrative costs and restrictions on the actual health
services guaranteed by the insurers known as
“administradoras de cápitas” (Sojo, 1997, p. 47).
Clear evidence of insurers abusing their dominant
position makes it urgent for rules and sanctions to be
established. Thus, there are the “abuses of certain
insurers, particularly subsidized system insurers, that
really act as expensive intermediaries rather than
carrying out a useful insurance role”. For example, there
are subsidized system insurers that simply absorb a
large percentage of the per capita payment and transfer
the balance to a second intermediary, which
subcontracts providers. Again, when there is no
competition among insurers, payment arrears are
compounded by abusive practices whereby tariffs are
imposed on hospitals whose negotiating capacities are
weak, sometimes in partnership with municipal
authorities (Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999, pp.
23, 49 and 50). This is quite apart from the fact that
this per capita payment, being a non-risk-adjusted
general average, is an incentive to adverse selection
(Mora and Malabet, 1998).
Again, the way insurers in both the contributory
system and the subsidized system delay paying
hospitals highlights a serious lack of regulation from
which the public hospital system suffers, regardless of
performance.
The Ministry of Health is criticized for its weak
regulatory capabilities when it comes to laying down
general rules to unify the decentralization dynamic. The
complaint is that there are no solid minimum guidelines
to back up national criteria for employment terms,
information quality standards or financial management.
Of the fragmented standards of the territorial
organizations, it has been said that “rather than a
national reform, there may be said to have been
numerous local reforms, with varying degrees of
progress and little horizontal communication” (Mora
and Malabet, 1998, p. 59).
Regulation has also failed to achieve territorial
equity in health-care access and a sufficient degree of
vertical and horizontal integration among the different
levels of care, aspects that are interrelated. Regional or
territorial coordination of the service supply network
is the responsibility of regional and municipal health
directorates, which are supposed to ensure that
problems between public- and private-sector providers
can be smoothly resolved and that the relations between
the two are complementary. The responsiveness of
private-sector providers and insurers in smaller and less
developed territorial entities was overestimated,
however; in economies with large distributional
disparities, the market naturally draws private-sector
suppliers, particularly high-quality ones, to the high-
income sectors (Ocampo, 1996). Combined with the
problems of public institutions, this has resulted in
serious and costly imbalances in territorial supply
(Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999, p. 63).
Immediately, then, we have the paradoxes that arise
when self-financing hospitals are left to themselves and
are not tied in to any system of referral and counter-
referral. To deal with these paradoxes there need to be
regulations, which could well be incorporated into
management instruments such as contracts. For
example, the experience of Catalonia and, more
recently, that of Costa Rica show that it is possible to
create the conditions for integration of the different
levels of care and for referral and counter-referral
networks by using performance-linked financing
contracts, with public-sector organizations and with
private-sector ones (Gallego, 1999, pp. 55-57, 76-77
and 265; Franch, n.d., and Sojo, 1998, pp. 94 and 95).
With a few exceptions,19 however, the reforms
inexplicably neglect epidemiological factors and
19
 One exception is the Department of Huila, where steps have
been taken to redistribute treatment services among the three
hospital levels, strengthening level I and concentrating more
specialist care in the other two (Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe,
1999, p. 54).
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necessary measures such as the promotion of preventive
care programmes, integration of the different levels of
treatment and the creation of referral and counter-
referral networks. Since public hospitals were not
restructured with reference to territorial supply, but in
isolation, the range of services to be supplied by them
was left to their own discretion. Most of these hospitals
have still not determined fully and explicitly what it is
they are supplying. Responsibility for referring patients
has presumably been left in the hands of the two
systems’ insurers, and responsibility for
epidemiological follow-up in the hands of the
departments, but a systemic vision and the necessary
instruments are lacking.
In the same way as in the private sector, public
hospitals’ need to provide for their own financing tends
to restrict the services available to vulnerable sections
of society that are unprofitable for them. At the same
time as public hospitals, including level I hospitals, have
tried to adapt to the new circumstances by creating
management instruments such as invoicing and by
considering profitability variables, they have allowed
the range of services they supply to become unbalanced
and have neglected the epidemiological profile as one
of the determining factors in their activities, and this
has led to an appreciable deterioration in preventive
programmes such as vaccination, the early detection
of diseases and integral treatment of particular illnesses.
Combined with the segmentation of epidemiological
monitoring and the fragmentation of programmes, these
factors have resulted in the coverage of vaccinations
against tuberculosis, against diphtheria, tetanus and
pertussis (DTP) and against poliomyelitis declining during
the reform years, in some cases to levels regarded as too
low to be effective (Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999,
pp. 66, 70 and 71, and Economic Research Centre,
2000).20 Fundamental issues are also at stake, such as
the need to redefine the traditional role of hospitals in
vaccination programmes, the costs of which fall
appreciably if they are carried out in less sophisticated
parts of the health system. Furthermore, hospitals do not
have the financing they need to do this work, and since
full responsibility for it has not been taken by the
municipalities or other bodies, coverage has fallen.21
Decentralization is still a work in progress. The
much-criticized sectoral incursions into local autonomy
represented by national standards setting out in detail
how resources should be used (Vargas and Sarmiento,
1998) have not ensured the comprehensiveness of
prevention programmes or the national and local
consistency of epidemiological surveillance. Rules are
being drawn up to unify promotion, early detection and
prevention criteria, content and activities on the basis
of “induced demand and the obligation to meet it” over
and above passive user demand (Colombia, National
Council of Social Security in Health, 2000, p. 27),
whose institutional basis has yet to be determined.
3. From defensive strategies to management
reform
The status of ESEs is ambiguous, and is complicated by
the operation of two logics: they can be governed by
private law, and they can invoke civil service
employment clauses. While employment terms
governed by private law allow for collective labour
agreements and the creation of unions, civil servants
cannot enter into collective agreements.
The manager and board of an ESE can hire non-
permanent staff, buy inputs and invest in equipment,
and decide how operating surpluses should be used.
Surpluses may be used for employee bonuses,
investments or cross-subsidies among services. Inputs,
medicines or the services of specialists can be purchased
on private system terms. Public-sector bodies are legally
entitled, however, to use what are known as “exorbitant”
public-sector employment clauses which allow them,
for example, to terminate contracts unilaterally.22
Discretion in recruitment within a framework of
rigidities has meant that most new jobs in hospitals are
not permanent, but are generally subject to temporary
contracts. Only 18% of new jobs are staff ones, and
this has given rise to a “parallel staff” that has increased
from 3,000 to 10,000 people and that can be managed
very flexibly (Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999,
pp. 23 and 43).
The flexibility with which permanent staff
members can be managed, meanwhile, is limited by
the fact that they still have the status of civil servants
20
 This tendency is also manifested in the way human resources in
the health sector have grown. Dentists have increased most in
number (52%), followed by doctors (47%), promoters (19%) and
sanitation technicians (18%) (Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999).
21
 Concerns expressed by Juan Fernando Alviar, head of the
Rivaralda Public Health Operations Department, in a conversation
held in Santiago on 22 May 2001. In 1999, immunization coverage
was extended by an ad hoc programme to purchase vaccines using
Solidarity and Guarantee Fund resources (Colombia, National
Council of Social Security in Health, 2000, pp. 31 ff.).
22
 This information was provided by Iván Jaramillo.
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and official workers, in accordance with the public-
sector selection, appointment and employment system
as defined by current labour laws and collective
agreements, and enjoy large extralegal benefits. The
employment legislation is quite rigid and wage
increases are agreed nationally by central government
for all staff members in hospitals and welfare centres
(Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999, pp. 17-19, 60-
66 and 88-90).
In cases where hospital reorganization has been a
success, as in Antioquia, three crucial factors emerge:
early measures to increase staff flexibility so that
spending in this area can be rationalized, better
leadership and management capabilities at the top, and
a context in which insurance plays a stronger role
(Londoño, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999, p. 65).
Experiments with changes to public hospital
incentives have involved instruments such as contracts,
accountability mechanisms, greater autonomy in
financial and administrative areas such as procurement
and recruitment, the retention of efficiency savings to
be used for productivity bonuses, information systems
to follow up performance and productivity, surveys to
measure user satisfaction, changes to staff composition
and working hours in hospitals, and invoicing systems.23
These experiments aside, there has been little innovation
in employment practices. There are no general
performance indicators to measure improvements in
efficiency and equity in autonomous hospitals, and there
have been no agreements relating to the use of forward
payments and historical budgets; more than 60% of
municipalities are under investigation for diversion and
misuse of health-care resources (Londoño, Jaramillo
and Uribe, 1999, pp. 50 and 59).
When solidarity and universality are being pursued
within a competitive framework, public-sector
management reform needs to foster genuinely
competitive and complementary relationships between
the public and private sectors, make it possible for the
public sector to compete on cost and quality, and
contribute to better design of the public-private mix. It
is thus essential to systematize the positive and negative
aspects of the experiments carried out so that reform
can be undertaken, at least gradually, in the management
of the hospital network as a whole.
Conversely, it does not seem advisable to apply
strategies to defend and protect the public sector from
competition, if this means delaying or avoiding urgent
management reform. This is what the Social Security
Institute (ISS) did, choosing to cope with competition
within the contributory system by adopting an
eminently defensive strategy, rather than increasing its
efficiency and effectiveness by undertaking far-reaching
management reforms at the time competition was
introduced. It was then granted certain protective
advantages or privileges: it could combine insurance
and provision functions, it was not required to collect
co-payments, and it was authorized to offer an extended
benefits plan that was not subject to the waiting
periods24 prescribed by law (Londoño, Jaramillo and
Uribe, 1999, p. 47). Despite all this, ISS ran up deficits
and saw its asset position deteriorate, the result being a
crisis of such proportions that it has been debarred from
taking on new subscribers since mid-1998.
Again, to give greater security and protection to
the public network and make the provision of health
services to the poorest more attractive, Law 344 of 1996
required subsidized system insurers to contract for a
compulsory minimum of services with public hospitals,
equivalent to 40% of the resources of the subsidized
system. In some regions of the country, hospitals or
their unions have refused to turn themselves into ESEs
and forfeit historical budget financing, and there has
been pressure for the subsidized system to be tied to
the public hospital network. Level I hospitals have been
the most reluctant to turn themselves into ESEs. The
transformation of supply subsidies into demand
subsidies was frozen because of the illiquidity of some
public hospitals (Jaramillo, 2000, pp. 37, 38 and 58).
As of late 1998, about a third of all high- and
medium-complexity hospitals were resisting
modernization. They had not adapted their
organizational structure to the new legal framework,
and in many cases they were being run by interim
managements that were too unstable to bring about
transformation and improvement. Some hospitals were
prevented from adapting to the new model by the
overwhelming inflexibility and inefficiency of their old
structures, and had to close. Others, faced with the
possibility of liquidation, pressed for greater resources
that were not tied to productivity (Londoño, Jaramillo
and Uribe, 1999, pp. 49 and 64).
Certain management changes are important
because of their role in supporting other aspects of
23
 Examples include the Garcés Navas Hospital, the El Tunal
Hospital and the Jorge Bejarano Children’s Clinic.
24
 When an insurance policy is initially taken out, waiting periods
apply. These require a set amount of contributions to have been
paid before certain services and benefits can be taken up, the
purpose being to ensure the stability of contributions.
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reform. For example, to determine the cost of capitation
units accurately and progress with price negotiation, it
is essential to have reliable records on activity, costs
and quality, and invoicing systems that enhance
management capabilities.
Many of these challenges can be dealt with if
consensus is achieved. As in the case of
decentralization, the political realities of the process
need to be recognized if general agreement is to be
reached on the best way of dealing with new challenges
and problems. Similarly, the fragmentation of
responsibilities among the different levels of
government and the complexity or lack of clarity
characterizing regulations are often the result of
unsatisfactory negotiations among the opposing
interests affected (Chiappe, 1999, p. 3).
IV
Argentina: the diversity of
hospital decentralization
In Argentina, reform has had two pillars. One has been
the promotion of free choice and of efficiency and
equity among health insurers, which are known as
“obras sociales” (social organizations); there has
recently been legislation to address the excessive
proliferation of the financial intermediaries known as
“administradoras de cápitas”. The other pillar has been
hospital self-management, which is supposed to raise
efficiency and thus address the major challenges posed
by the excessive size of hospitals, cross-subsidies to
health insurers, inadequate referral and counter-referral
systems, deep-rooted conservatism in management
practices and vagueness about the way some functions
are to be financed –teaching being an example– under
the self-management system (Sojo, 1997 and Tafani,
1997).
1. The spirit and instruments of hospital reform
In 1993, the general legal framework for hospital
autonomy was created by decree. This envisages self-
managed public hospitals being grouped into a system
of hospital-centred health service networks which are
supposed to link up and coordinate the health services
supplied by public- and private-sector providers in a
system of universal, compulsory coverage, with a
pluralistic,25 participatory and administratively
decentralized structure. It also stipulates that the health
insurers should pay hospitals for the services received
by their policyholders, and establishes a mechanism
whereby the debts that the insurers accrue with hospitals
are automatically deducted from the subscription
transfers made to them.
The separation of functions has been carried out
in accordance with the situation in the provinces, and
regulation is envisaged, in certain areas, as being
decentralized. This creates the risk that regulation may
be fragmentary and atomized, lacking a national
framework of rules to back up the minimum criteria,
guidelines and standards applicable to the contractual
relationships between insurers and providers, and to
the quality of provision or management.
In the case of Salta,26 for example, the board of
the insurer lays down the provisions governing the
different forms of contractual relationship between it
and providers and participates in drawing up and
25
 The idea of pluralistic participation is reflected in the make-up
of boards. In the case of a public-sector insurer such as the Salta
Provincial Health Insurance Institute, for example, the board
consists of a chairman and five directors. The chairman is appointed
by the government on the recommendation of the Ministry of Public
Health. The directors represent public-sector providers, private-
sector providers, the health insurers with the most policyholders in
the province, municipalities with institutional autonomy and
policyholders themselves. The Ministry notifies the government
executive of the candidates it has chosen from the shortlists of three
submitted by the relevant organizations and is represented at the
creation of the Standing Coordination Commission (Comisión
Permanente de Concertación), which is chaired by the secretary of
health services or his deputy and composed of representatives of
the board of the Provincial Health Insurance Institute and the
majority representatives of providers at the provincial level
(Argentina, Government of, 1998b).
26
 By virtue of the bill to enact the Salta Provincial Health Insurance
Institute constitutional law (Argentina, Government of, 1998b).
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updating the regulatory instruments used. The Standing
Coordination Commission is responsible for drawing
up the rules, procedures and standards of usage that
service provision must comply with, and for setting
payment procedures and amounts. This last could blur
the dividing line between the financing function and
the provision function, and could lead to coordination
in these areas becoming confused with regulation, a
power that should remain in the hands of the purchasing
body.
The management reform provides for
improvements in processes, such as the creation of a
unified medical register in the case of Mendoza,
databases for identifying the patient population, the
provision to all users of confirmation documents linking
them to the relevant medical centres, and the
maintenance of up-to-date medical records. An effort
is also being made to raise quality standards by means
of Citizen Charters (Cartas de Compromiso con el
Ciudadano), which explain the services available and
the quality standards that are to be met (Neirotti, 1999).
Factors that are believed to have helped create
consensus among influential actors in relation to
hospital reform include training for the professionals
involved, early measures to increase understanding of
the reforms applied to hospitals and health insurers,27
and pilot projects that have placed a strong emphasis
on organizational development in the city of Buenos
Aires, in the provinces of Buenos Aires and Mendoza,
and to a lesser degree in other places (Abrantes, 2000).28
Hospitals that operate under the self-management
system can enter into contracts with insurers and with
suppliers of services that the hospital itself does not
provide. They can assign, promote and transfer
employees within their staff. They can exercise a degree
of control over their operating plan and annual budget.
They can sell services, collect co-payments that vary
by income group and use this income, along with the
revenue from health insurers, for staff productivity
incentives, investments or maintenance. Experiments
are being carried out with independent financing of the
training and education functions carried out by
hospitals.
2. Hospital management contracts
Management contracts for hospital financing, which are
supposed to replace historical budget financing, have
gradually been coming into use since 1998 as a “legal
fiction” for familiarization purposes. Because of
decentralization, hospitals were already attached to
provinces, and in some cases to municipalities, when
the process began. Consequently, hospital self-
management has developed slightly differently from
place to place, and no single management contract
model has been applied, the idea being that contracts
in each province should reflect the way the separation
of functions has been organized there (Sánchez de León,
1998, p. 50).29
For example, the change in prospect is most radical
in Salta, where the management contract should be
instrumental in introducing what in Chile and Colombia
has been called the “demand subsidy” resource
allocation method. In La Pampa, on the other hand, the
emphasis has been put on the economic incentives that
can be redistributed in self-managing hospitals from
the funds generated by invoicing health insurers. In
Santa Fe, again, efforts are being made to consolidate
a decentralization model that has been operating for
several decades, by applying a management contract
(Pressal, 1998, p. 11). A few hospitals in each province
have been chosen to work with management contracts
(ibid., p. 32).
Management contracts sometimes include quite
detailed targets, with activity and efficiency indices
(average days of hospitalization, number of discharges,
number of operations) and quality indices (days of
hospitalization before surgery, waiting time at the
prediagnostic and laboratory stages, formation of
hospital infection committees). As regards staff, the aim
is generally to reduce absenteeism and encourage
training (Argentina, Government of, 1998a; Neirotti,
1999; Abrantes and Días Legaspe, 1999 and Abrantes,
2000).
Other contracts include a wider range of aspects
connected with process improvements and participation
in the provider network, resembling the complex
management contracts of Costa Rica. Thus, in the case
of La Pampa contracts include (with differences of
emphasis in each hospital): compliance with diagnostic
and therapeutic protocols, referral and counter-referral
procedures, resolution capabilities corresponding to the
27
 The relevant documentation can be consulted at http://
www.msal.gov.ar/pressal.
28
 Hospitals participating in these pilot projects hosted a resident
team of hospital management consultants who worked with the
hospital management to define their mission and objectives, develop
a medium-term plan and coordinate short consultancy projects
dealing with specific issues (Pressal, 1998).
29
 For examples of theoretical proposals and provincial experiences,
see Pressal (1998).
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level of complexity, updating of medical records and
the registry system, consolidation of the gatekeeper
system, measurements of user satisfaction, community
education programmes, and implementation of
prevention programmes (Pressal, 1998, p. 40).
Substandard invoicing systems are being
upgraded. Recovery of costs from insurers has been
improved, making it possible to offer individual
performance bonuses that in some cases can double
doctors’ incomes. Because hospital reform is taking
place within a framework of fiscal discipline linked
to provincial reform projects, the provinces have
restricted hospitals’ financial independence and
freedom to recruit staff. The financial slack from
which incentives are paid has had to come essentially
from efficiency gains, revenue from services provided
to insurers, co-payments and reductions in the
proportion of spending that goes on staff, where there
is scope for this (Abrantes, 2000).
As was pointed out earlier, financing the incentive
system from social security charges and invoicing, while
it may initially boost production, carries with it an
incentive to practise selection to the detriment of the
uninsured population. In the interests of equity,
therefore, it is important to design budgets with flexible
components that can be used for incentives (Pressal,
1998, p. 51). It has also been noted that pay supplements
financed out of charges to the different insurers have
not always been linked to performance incentives. In
Mendoza, for example, these incentives were granted
in 1998 to professionals and non-professionals, while
managers were excluded, but as part of a “more for the
same” distribution scheme (ibid., p. 38).
3. The degrees of hospital autonomy
Where degrees of hospital autonomy are concerned,
three basic situations can be broadly distinguished at
the territorial level.30 In the provinces of Entre Ríos,
Formosa, La Rioja, San Luis, Santiago del Estero and
Tucumán, most hospitals are still financed on a
historical budget basis, and their autonomy is very
restricted. In Salta and San Juan, on the other hand,
hospitals operate as trusts, are governed by public and
private law, have freedom to manage their staff and
assets and can use the resources they generate as they
see fit.
Management contracts have been concluded
between hospitals and provinces and among hospitals;
these contracts include some performance indicators
relating to efficiency and service quality. Hospitals have
to compete with other public- and private-sector
providers, and the customer base is segmented between
those who have insurance or pay for services on the
one hand, and the uninsured poor who are treated for
free on the other. Managers have fixed-term contracts
that are not aligned to the political cycle. Internally
generated revenue can be used for investments,
maintenance and staff performance incentives. In Salta,
Tucumán and San Juan, poor and uninsured users
should be able to choose between public- and private-
sector providers from 2003 onward.
The largest hospitals in Corrientes, Catamarca, La
Pampa, Mendoza and Río Negro are in an intermediate
situation. These are financed on a historical budget
basis, have administrative and technical councils that
appoint managers, and have acquired a degree of
autonomy over inputs other than human resources. They
can retain up to 80% of revenue from services to insured
users and use this for performance incentives,
investments and maintenance. Where staff are
concerned, although the hospitals can promote
employees and encourage them to take early retirement,
they cannot recruit or dismiss them. While contracts
contain performance indicators, only in Río Negro are
individual performance bonuses linked to success in
meeting targets. The provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre
Ríos and Santa Fe have similar legislation, but change
has been relatively slow or inconsistent.
The Dr. Juan Garraham National Paediatric
Hospital in Buenos Aires, which is a level III (referral)
one, and the José de San Martín Teaching Hospital,
which is the University of Buenos Aires teaching
hospital, are public-sector enterprises that have full
control of their budgets and their own revenue, and full
responsibility for the debts they incur, although the San
Martín Hospital recently succeeded in obtaining a bail-
out for a significant debt that it had accumulated. Both
are remarkable for the amount of investment and
maintenance revenue they are generating on their own,
amounting to almost a third of their budgets.30 Distinction drawn by Abrantes (2000).
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V
Management contracts in a predominantly
public system: Costa Rica31
In the midst of an advanced epidemiological and
demographic transition, Costa Rica, which has achieved
effectively universal health cover with its public health
system, is seeking to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the public-sector institutions providing
health services. The crux of the reform, which has been
implemented gradually since 1996, is the introduction
of management contracts.
The aim is to move beyond the implicit and explicit
pattern of traditional management at the Costa Rican
Social Security Fund (CCSS), a body which acts as both
insurer and provider, and its underlying system of
negative incentives, which is characteristic of
traditional, non-performance-related financing:
inequality in the supply of services, which is influenced
by the leverage of each centre; indifference to user
dissatisfaction; medical agendas that give rise to a kind
of captive market controlled by specialists;
administrative control of the budget and ignorance of
the cost of services; pay determined by length of service
and not by assessment of staff performance; a high level
of absenteeism, replacements and incapacities; and self-
regulation by professionals in the sphere of clinical
management.
1. Reform instruments
In 1997, CCSS separated its internal financial and service
provision functions, and it has since created a
procurement function, although this is still at the
gestation stage and has not yet been fully separated
from the financial function. Management contracts with
hospitals and health areas were introduced gradually
and selectively until by 2000 coverage was complete,
but the resources earmarked for the procurement
function did not increase proportionately.
This quasi-market is subject to a great deal of
internal regulation, as it is the central level of CCSS that
has the power to collect funds directly, set rules, carry
out regulation and make appointments to key posts. This
entails intense internal negotiations, however, since the
basic decisions are taken by the CCSS board. The
procurement function is monopsonic, as there is no
provision for micropurchasers or mesopurchasers,
while the provision function is deconcentrated, being
spread around numerous CCSS and cooperative bodies.
A new financing model is being promoted, the
guiding principles being solidarity, universality and
equity. The theoretical financing model includes a
variable budgetary component that is tied to the
achievement of goals and objectives. This amounts to
10% of the total budget and is divided equally between
an incentive fund and a solidarity fund to cope with
unforeseen expenses during budget implementation. At
the first level of care, there is to be a shift from historical
financing towards per capita payments adjusted for the
pattern of service use as determined by the infant
mortality rates and sex and age structures of the
populations served, the aim being to reverse the current
inequalities in local resource allocation. At the second
and third levels of care, the overall activity of each
hospital is broken down initially into four areas:
hospitalization, out-patient care in specialist and non-
specialist surgeries, emergency, and teaching, research
and special welfare programmes. For these, a
homogeneous unit of production is established,
consisting of a standard equivalence coefficient known
as the hospital output unit (unidad de producción
hospitalaria, or UPH). The target values for the hospital
output unit, the main factor in which is the length of
hospital stays, are laid down in a schedule that is
invariable for the life of the agreement. The objective
at these levels is to move eventually towards a system
of payment by case mix or related diagnostic groups.
Historical budgets were taken as the baseline for
the change, and 1994 data were used to construct an
output function. A dry run has been in operation since
then, so that the resources provided are still not tied to
compliance with agreements or to the new financing
model.
2. Paradoxes of contractual complexity
Measuring performance, which is what these
agreements are essentially designed to do, generates31 For a detailed study, see Sojo (1998 and 1999b).
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process innovations that can help to systematize service
provision,  illuminate specific aspects of its
effectiveness, restructure provider organizations and
modify their management culture. To be effective, it
requires the creation and maintenance of reliable
records on activities, costs and quality, and information
systems that can strengthen management capabilities.
It also encourages the use of interesting and potentially
very important instruments, such as clinical protocols.
Contracts are specific to health areas, and to the second
and third levels of care, although convergence is taking
place where the aspects under consideration are
concerned.32
By contrast with Colombia, where, as we have
seen, preventive health care and referral systems have
been neglected, these contracts promote improvements
in the organization of the health system and service
provision; in particular, they encourage interaction
among the three levels of care. Where the health areas
are concerned, they reward the ability to resolve cases
and reduce referrals, and encourage prevention and
promotion activities to reduce sickness and death rates
and consolidate desirable health conditions over the
medium and long term. Where hospitals are concerned,
they lay down referral system rules and in some cases
specify a hospital network that is to be consolidated.
They encourage second-level institutions to carry out
consultation and training activities for the first level,
and promote measures to check the actual coverage of
the enrolled population.
Importance is also given to the quality of care,
which is envisaged as a continuous process of
improvement. Quality measurement is provided for in
the form of indicators relating to the effectiveness of
medical services (patient health complications, trend
of the death rate and causes of death, etc.), or in the
form of procedures to ensure that medicines are
properly used, improve individual health records or
control hospital infections. There is concern to improve
aspects relating to the promptness and accessibility of
treatment so that resource use can be optimized. For
this purpose, some efficiency indices have been
established (reduction of waiting lists, handling of
emergencies, better use of installed capacity such as
operating theatres, reduction of medical absenteeism,
improvements to support services such as pharmacy
services). Measures to identify staff responsibilities and
processes have been adopted, as have mechanisms to
ascertain user satisfaction and deal with complaints.
Although progress has been made in creating the
conditions needed for invoicing to be viable (something
that is essential for the new financing model), these
conditions have not yet been applied. Evaluation criteria
have gradually been standardized and progress has been
made in refining the criteria for classifying output and
verifying production budgets in accordance with the
activities of providers.33
The ever-increasing variety of indicators used in
contracts, however, and the wide range of objectives,
could make them difficult to apply, complicate any
evaluation that looks beyond quantitative criteria to seek
to identify the conditions that work for and against
compliance, and result in excessive transaction costs.
This suggests there is a need to rank indicators by
importance, limit their number and ensure continuity,
if changes in processes and information systems are to
be consolidated.
For the same reason, objectives and goals should
be scaled down. The format of agreements, the range
of aspects and indicators included, and the fact that
resource transfers have not yet been made conditional
on compliance, mean that contracts resemble a form of
planning by objectives, isolating or crystallizing certain
priorities and aspects of organization and service
provision that providers are asked to comply with. This
may have something to do with the decision to make
the process a gradual one, as this resulted in a
“conservative” specification of the products to be
purchased at an initial stage, both in quantitative terms,
as historical budgets were used as the baseline, and also
in terms of the classification of these products by
factors, to determine both the objectives and the
indicators to be evaluated (Guzmán, 1999, p. 60).
Although this decision may have helped to prevent
turmoil in units by ensuring the coexistence of
traditional elements that are tied in to the reform through
32
 For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of these agreements
and of the financing model, see Sojo (1998).
33
 Where hospitals are concerned, for example, consideration has
been given to the degree of comparability among centres, and they
have been segregated so that four sets of activities can be assigned
to them: a) social security, which is regarded as comparable and
measurable in hospital output units; b) key specialisms, such as
those of San Juan de Dios (burns), Calderón Guardia (liver
transplants) or México (heart transplants); c) extraordinary
activities, such as measures to combat dengue or cholera; d)
investments, for which there was previously no systematic
financing. Interview with René Escalante, manager of the
Administrative Division of CCSS, 10 December 1998.
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contracts, it could also result in agreements having an
excessive degree of complexity that proves difficult to
manage over time, complicates evaluation and entails
high transaction costs –the amount of information that
has to be obtained from providers, for example– that
may result in the agreements being mired in
bureaucracy, or becoming a dead letter.
Introducing financing by capitation, case mix or
related diagnostic groups will allow progress to be made
towards a set of agreements whose essential aims are the
effectiveness and efficiency of provision. Other aspects
of management reform, such as support for the use of
evidence-based medicine, can be linked to other
instruments that are integrated into essential activities, such
as epidemiological surveillance. Organizational aspects
and intermediate products, while not excluded, will
undoubtedly have to be emphasized less in agreements.
3. The legal basis
It is essential for contracts to be legally sound, as it is
this that determines not only the scope for applying
effective sanctions in the event of non-compliance, but
also the way conflicts are resolved within the market,
the rank of the authorities involved and the mechanisms
to be used for dealing with contractual omissions and
oversights and resolving disputes, among other aspects
(Walsh, 1995).
The management contracts of CCSS first acquired
a legal basis when they were approved by the board of
that institution. But in legal terms, these were “quasi-
contracts”, since hospitals and clinics had no legal
personality of their own. A crucial step towards legal
solidity was the act of parliament deconcentrating CCSS
hospitals and clinics, which made the management
contract the instrument that articulated and delimited
this deconcentration by establishing that hospitals and
clinics enjoyed an “instrumental legal personality” for
the purposes of “budgetary management, administrative
recruitment and the management and organization of
human resources subject to the legal provisions
applicable, the limits set by the Fund and the
management contract”. According to the person who
promoted it,34 an instrumental legal personality is
stronger than that of a deconcentrated body but weaker
than that of a decentralized one, as it is exercised strictly
within the spheres determined by law and delimited by
the agreement.
The deconcentration act also stipulated that the
organizations were to be run by the director, who was
to act in accordance with the objectives and obligations
set forth in the management contracts, with general
regulations and with the policy guidelines issued by
CCSS.
But reality always makes change awkward, and in
this case the provisions of the law reflect resistance to
rule changes. The legal changes were sought by the
CCSS executive, which has set itself no deadline for
completing the process, as it is trying to ensure it is not
traumatic. However, expectations and interpretations
of the scope of the law are not uniform among different
agencies of CCSS, where the prevailing interpretation is
that administration will be deconcentrated only to a
limited degree, while providers expect to achieve a high
degree of autonomy in the very near future. The
regulations support the view of limited administrative
deconcentration more than that of decentralized powers
and managerial independence (Guzmán, 1999, p. 82).
In addition, fundamental issues have yet to be
resolved if the legal framework is to be consistent with
new methods of assessing staff performance. There
would need to be amendments to the statutes of the
medical and nursing services that govern membership
of their professional bodies and determine how
recruitment and assessment are carried out within the
civil service system.35 The way professionals are
regulated under these statutes is an impediment to
managing them within CCSS. Among other problems, it
gives rise to conflicts of supervision, hinders the
effective performance of duties and encourages a trade
unionist attitude among staff (Ortiz and Sequeira, 1998,
pp. 99 and 100).
4. Staff performance
The preponderance of medical professionals and
paramedical staff very largely determines the nature of
the services provided, and the new incentive systems
are reshaping their power and affecting their room for
manoeuvre. To lay the basis for relationships of trust
under a new management model, and to ensure that
staff performance is adequately monitored, there is an
urgent need to change the staff recruitment and selection
practices and the retention rules currently followed in
CCSS.
34
 Interview of 7 December 1998 with Rodolfo Piza Rocafort,
executive president of CCSS.
35
 See University of Costa Rica (1998), cited by Ortiz and Sequeira
(1998, pp. 36 and 37).
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Security of employment that is detrimental to
performance, career progression by length of service
rather than merit, the agreement that four to five patients
should be seen an hour, the tortuous procedures for
dismissing staff36 and the inability of patients to choose
their doctor are all obstacles to thorough change in the
situation and, in general, to modernization of human
resource management in CCSS.
Changes need to be made to the criteria that govern
public service recruitment and retention, as the
inflexibility of employment terms is unquestionably a
crucial element that can be an obstacle to innovative
management. Staff appointments should be decided by
competition, promotion and pay should be based on
assessments of career performance, procedures for
dismissing staff should be simplified, and terms of
employment should be standardized. The efficiency and
productivity gains thus achieved could feed through to
improvements in pay based on the new criteria. In the
interests of equity, steps will have to be taken to ensure
that there is a balanced distribution of the necessary
human resources in all geographical areas.
The range of CCSS-financed private-sector
provision is currently being extended, to cut waiting
lists for specialities. Care should be taken here to
ensure that the movement of professionals between
the two sectors and the moral hazard this may involve
do not lead, for example, to CCSS professionals
deliberately reducing their productivity or neglecting
tasks such as proper equipment maintenance. It is
worrying to reflect that as restrictions are removed,
pockets of inefficiency may become entrenched in
CCSS provision, when the process should actually be
contributing to the reduction of waiting lists. Nor
should this process place a constraint on CCSS
infrastructure and equipment investment, as this would
result in back-door restrictions on public-sector
provision and possibly escalating costs, if the prices
paid to the private sector were higher than the price
levels that CCSS should be able to achieve if it were
operating efficiently. Again, co-payments (e.g., to
receive faster treatment in the private sector) should




By concentrating on insurance and financing, the health
reforms carried out in the region have not always paid
sufficient attention to the organizational and
institutional variables associated with these.
Management changes have taken place in systems that
differ in terms of solidarity and universality. Chile lags
furthest behind when it comes to changes in financing
and action to remedy the shortcomings of management
contracts. In Colombia, the country that has perhaps
made most progress in building up a new financing
system and the rules to govern it, hospital financing is
excessively complex and suffers from the negative
effects of financial intermediation. Although the country
can show successes with pilot projects, most hospitals
are relatively neglectful of management and are only
loosely tied in to referral and counter-referral networks.
In Argentina, the most striking feature of hospital
reform is the variety of forms taken on by hospital self-
management, as this was introduced in a decentralized
context; there is currently discussion of regulating risk
selection, improving performance measurements as a
basis for the provision of incentives, moving towards
financial autonomy and taking steps to deal with
excessive hospital size. In Costa Rica, financing changes
are still at the experimental stage; the country’s
management contracts are interesting because of the
changes they imply for processes, decentralization and
improvements to the institutional network, although
their growing complexity may militate against their
objectives.
36
 The procedures for dismissing staff need to be simplified
nationally. At present, they involve due process applications,
appeals, the local commission and the central commission for labour
relations. The problem is that a bill is needed to regulate this issue,
and the basis of employment needs to be standardized for the
different sectors. These are some of the challenges described by
Dr. Elías Jiménez, then director general of the National Children’s
Hospital, in an interview conducted on 5 February 1998.
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